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I. INTRODUCTION
As illustrated by the increase in alcohol-related traffic fatalities
during 1986,1 immoderate alcohol consumption and driving a motor
vehicle do not mix.2 States have taken different approaches in at-
tempting to facilitate the prosecution of those who engage in this anti-
social behavior. One approach common to all states has been to seek
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1. After declining steadily from a 1982 high of 25,166, the number of alcohol-
related traffic fatalities jumped back up by more than 1600 to a 1986 total of 23,987.
A related statistic reports 1,793,300 drunk-driving arrests for 1986, a 39% increase
over the level in 1977. Press, The Menace on the Roads, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 21, 1987,
at 42.
2. In a recent dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Peterson of the Oregon Supreme
Court noted the following statistics regarding the results of intoxicated drivers:
Nationally:
** Approximately 50 percent of all traffic fatalities occur in alcohol-related
crashes. This means that more than 20,000 lives are lost each year in alco-
hol-related crashes.
** About 560,000 people are injured each year in alcohol-related crashes,
43,000 of them seriously.
** More than half of alcohol-related fatalities occur in single-vehicle^
crashes.
** About two-thirds of all people killed in alcohol-involved crashes are
drivers or pedestrians who had been drinking, while one-third are innocent
victims: drivers or non-occupants (primarily pedestrians and pedalcyclists)
and passengers in either vehicle.
** The proportion of alcohol-related fatal crashes is about three times
greater at night than during the day. Between midnight and 4 a.m., about 80
percent of drivers killed have been drinking.
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ways to induce those suspected of drunk driving to submit to a chemi-
cal test for alcohol intoxication. Most seek to compel the test by sus-
pending the driving privileges of those suspects who refuse.3 Two
states, Alaska and Nebraska, have taken a different approach. Both
have made it a separate misdemeanor crime to refuse to submit to a
chemical test when lawfully under arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated,4 with penalties identical to an intoxicated driving charge.5
Alaska's "Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test"6 and the nearly
identical provisions of the Anchorage Municipal Code7 were under
challenge in the case of Burnett v. Municipality ofAnchorage. 8 In Bur-
nett, two individuals, Peter Burnett and Daniel C. Ryan, were con-
victed under Anchorage's refusal ordinance, and one individual,
Raymond Roop, was convicted under the state statute. 9 In petitions
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 116-17, 743 P.2d 692, 702-03 (1986) (citing data
compiled by the NHTSA/National Center for Statistics and Analysis (Aug. 1986)).
3. See Bruns, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REv. 935, 935-36 & n.4 (1980) [hereinafter
Bruns]; Note, The Theory and Practice of Implied Consent in Colorado, 47 U. COLO.
L. REv. 723, 725 & n.9 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Implied Consent]; Lerblance, Im-
plied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 39
n.3 (1978) [hereinafter Lerblance].
4. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(a) (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1984 &
Supp. 1987).
5. ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.35.032(g), .030(c) (1987) (A refusal to submit to chemi-
cal testing results in the denial or revocation of the driver's license; refusal may also be
used against an individual in both criminal and civil proceedings; a conviction carries
a minimum sentence of 72 hours' imprisonment and a $250 fine for the first convic-
tion; subsequent convictions carry a minimum sentence of 20 days' imprisonment and
a $500 fine; and penalties increase for each subsequent conviction.); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 39-669.08 (1984 & Supp. 1987), 28-106 (1985) (A person who refuses to submit to a
preliminary breath test shall be placed under arrest and is guilty of a Class V misde-
meanor, which carries a maximum fine of $100 but no imprisonment; once arrested, a
person who refuses to consent to chemical testing, if subsequently convicted of the
crime and if the individual has no previous convictions for refusal, shall be guilty of a
Class W misdemeanor, carrying a mandatory seven-day prison term and a $200 fine;
in addition, the person's driver's license will be revoked for six months. The penalties
increase for each subsequent conviction.).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (1987) [hereinafter "refusal statute"].
7. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.28.022 (1983).
8. 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1449. Burnett and Roop were both unsuccessful in appealing their con-
victions. See Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 678 P.2d 1364 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984), petition for hearing denied, No. S-439 (Alaska June 7, 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 859 (1984); Roop v. State of Alaska, No. A-375 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1984),
petition for hearing denied, No. S-668 (Alaska Nov. 14, 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1016 (1985). Ryan did not appeal his conviction. See Burnett v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (The court found that Ryan was
excused from not exhausting his state remedies "on the basis that further resort to
state forums would have been futile."). Burnett, Roop, and Ryan subsequently and
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for post-conviction relief, these defendants asserted that requiring sub-
mission to a breath test could be justified neither as a search incident
to arrest, nor as a consensual search. The United States District Court
for the District of Alaska denied relief, reasoning that Alaska's re-
quirement that arrestees submit to breath tests was valid both as a
search incident to arrest and as a consent search. 10 The Ninth Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge J. Blaine Anderson, affirmed the district court's
holding that the requirement to take a breath test was valid as a search
incident to arrest, but it neither relied on nor discussed the district
court's consent search rationale.11
Part II will briefly recount the factual context of the case. Part
III will trace the district court's and the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
finding the requirement supportable as a search incident to arrest and
will conclude that the court was incorrect. Based on a correct reading
of Schmerber v. California, 12 this article will show that, to be valid,
chemical test searches must be justified by "exigent circumstances."
Part IV will assess the district court's finding that chemical tests are
sustainable as consent searches and will conclude that, because of the
coercive and involuntary nature of the tests, this holding was wrongly
decided. Part V will conclude that (1) in the absence of actual con-
sent, only the presence of exigent circumstances can sustain breath
tests as warrantless searches, and (2) actual consent cannot be implied
by statute.
II. THE FACTS OF BURNETT V MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
Peter Burnett and Daniel Ryan were arrested on separate occa-
sions by Anchorage police officers for driving while intoxicated.13
Raymond Roop was arrested for the same offense by an Alaska state
trooper.' 4 The three arrests occurred during 1983 and 1984. All three
arrestees were advised of the relevant implied consent law applicable
to each of them s and the penalties for refusing to submit to the breath
separately sought federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See Bur-
nett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Alaska), aff'd, 806 F.2d
1447 (9th Cir. 1986). These latter two federal court decisions are the focus of this
article.
10. 634 F. Supp. at 1034-38.
11. 806 F.2d at 1451. The defendants chose not to seek review in the United
States Supreme Court. Letter from Jim Wolf, Anchorage Deputy Municipal Prosecu-
tor, to D. Bernard Zaleha (Aug. 14, 1987) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
12. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
13. Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (D. Alaska),
aff'd, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
14. Id.
15. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(a) (1987) provides as follows:
A person who operates or drives a motor vehicle in this state ... shall be
considered to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's
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test.16 All three were asked to take the breathalyzer test, which they
peacefully refused. 17 They were charged under the respective provi-
sions with both driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and refusal. The
three defendants argued unsuccessfully in pre-trial motions to dismiss
that the refusal statutes violated their fourth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights under the United States Constitution.18
breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person's
blood or breath if lawfully arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged
to have been committed while the person was operating or driving a motor
vehicle.., while intoxicated.
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.28.021(A) (1983) mirrors this provi-
sion with similar language:
A person who operates, drives [or is in actual physical control] of a motor
vehicle [within the municipality] ... shall be considered to have given con-
sent to a chemical test or tests of [his or her] breath for the purpose of deter-
mining the alcoholic content of [his or her] blood or breath if lawfully
arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed
while the person was operating, driving [or is in actual physical control] of a
motor vehicle ....
(language differences in brackets).
16. "Refusal to submit to a chemical test of breath authorized by ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.031(a) is a Class A misdemeanor." ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (1987).
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(g) further provides that:
[u]pon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall impose a
minimum sentence of imprisonment of not less than 72 consecutive hours
and a fine of not less than $250 if the person has not been previously con-
victed in this or another jurisdiction of driving while intoxicated ... or re-
fusal to submit to a chemical test under this section or another law or
ordinance with substantially similar elements. Upon conviction under this
section the court shall impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment of not
less than 20 consecutive days and a fine of not less than $500 if, within the
preceding 10 years, the person has been previously convicted once in this or
another jurisdiction of driving while intoxicated.., or refusal to submit to a
chemical test under this section or another law or ordinance with substan-
tially similar elements. Upon conviction under this section the court shall
impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment of not less than 30 consecutive
days and a fine of not less than $1,000 if, within the previous 10 years, the
person has been previously convicted in this or another jurisdiction of more
than one of the following offenses: (1) driving while intoxicated ... ; (2) re-
fusal to submit to a chemical test under this section or another law or ordi-
nance with substantially similar elements. The execution of sentence may
not be suspended nor may probation be granted except on condition that the
minimum imprisonment provided in this section is served. Imposition of
sentence may not be suspended .... The sentence imposed by the court
under this subsection shall run consecutively with any other sentence of im-
prisonment imposed on the committed person.
The same penalties are provided by ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 9.28.022(D) (1983).
17. Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (D. Alaska),
aff'd, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
18. Id. at 1032.
[V9ol. 5:263
BREATH TEST REFUSAL
Burnett and Roop then pleaded no contest to the refusal charges,
but they reserved their right to appeal their convictions under an
Alaska procedure. 19 The prosecutors dropped their DWI charges, and
both defendants were fined.20 Burnett was given the usual first-time
sentence of thirty days in jail, with twenty-seven days suspended.
Roop was sentenced to sixty days in jail, with fifty-two days sus-
pended.21 Ryan went to trial and was acquitted of the DWI charge
but was convicted of refusal and sentenced to 180 days in jail with 140
days suspended.22
All three defendants appealed their convictions, again arguing
fourth and fourteenth amendment violations.23 Burnett's and Roop's
convictions were affirmed by the Alaska Court of Appeals.24 Both
Burnett and Roop then sought and were denied review by the Alaska
and United States Supreme Courts.25 The Alaska Superior Court re-
jected Ryan's constitutional arguments,26 and he sought no further
state court relief. Burnett, Ryan, and Roop, their convictions stayed,
then filed post-conviction proceedings in federal court.27 All three
cases were consolidated for the court's consideration. 28
III. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
As a practical matter, the petitioners in this case objected to the
fact that their refusals to submit to a chemical test were met with
criminal sanctions instead of the usual administrative license suspen-
sions applied in all but one of the other forty-nine states. 29 One legal
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. While within the range of a first-offender sentence, the eight days to serve
indicates that the judge found some aggravating circumstances, which usually involves
the presence of poor driving behavior, an accident, or a high breath alcohol. The
latter, of course, could not have been the basis here.
22. Id This sentence probably indicates that this was at least Ryan's third con-
viction for DWI or refusal within ten years, explaining at least in part why he elected
to go to trial. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(g) (1987) quoted supra note 16.
23. See supra note 9.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Alaska),
aff'd, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
27. Id
28. Id.
29. See Brief for Appellant at' 11-12, Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806
F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief] ("Appellants insist that the
Fourth Amendment includes 'the right of people to be secure in their persons...
against unreasonable searches and seizures.. .' and that imposing criminal sanctions
for withdrawing consent to a warrantless search has a constitutionally impermissible
chilling effect on the exercise of that right."). See also supra notes 3-5 and accompany-
ing text.
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argument they advanced to defeat this outcome was that requiring a
breath test was not a valid search incident to arrest. This argument
must be evaluated against the Supreme Court cases of Schmerber v.
California30 and South Dakota v. Neville. 31
A. Schmerber v. California
In Schmerber, the defendant had been involved in an automobile
accident and was taken to a hospital. A police officer requested that
he submit to a breathalyzer test3 2 or a blood-alcohol test, and the de-
fendant refused both tests. 33 Despite the refusal, the officer directed a
physician to withdraw a sample of blood from the defendant, which
was then seized and tested for alcohol content. The test results were
used against him at trial, and he was convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol. Contending that the blood-alcohol evidence used
against him was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure
violative of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution,
the defendant sought reversal in the Appellate Department of the Cali-
fornia Superior Court. The appellate department affirmed the convic-
tions, and, after further review was denied within California, the
United States Supreme Court granted review. 34
The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, framed the issue as
whether, given these particularized facts, the blood could be, drawn
without first procuring a search warrant.35 The Court began its dis-
cussion by distinguishing between searches permitted as an incident of
a lawful arrest and searches beyond the body's surface. The Court
noted that, in order to protect police officers from concealed weapons
and prevent the destruction of evidence within an arrestee's control,
police are allowed to search arrestees as an incident of their arrest,
regardless of the likelihood of finding either weapons or evidence. 36
The Court, however, found that "human dignity and privacy" inter-
ests prevented the extension of the so-called search-incident rationale
to searches beyond the body's surface.37 Warrantless body searches
could not be sustained on the "mere chance that desired evidence
might be obtained" but must be based on "a clear indication that in
fact such evidence will be found." 38
30. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
31. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
32. 384 U.S. at 765 n.9.
33. Id at 759, 765 n.9.
34. Id. at 758-59.
35. Id at 770.
36. Id at 769.
37. Id at 770.
38. Id
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Even applying this more rigorous test, however, the Court found
several factors present which upheld the warrantless search in this
case. First, the probable cause necessary for the underlying arrest for
drunk driving also established the relevance and likely success of find-
ing evidence by testing the defendant's blood. Second, the officer
might have reasonably believed, given the immediate onset of physio-
logical elimination of alcohol from the blood stream, that he was con-
fronted with an emergency situation whereby the imminent
destruction of evidence was threatened. Third, the method of testing
the blood-alcohol level was a reasonable one. Finally, minimal blood
was extracted through a process involving "virtually no risk, trauma,
or pain."'3 9 The Court, therefore, held that, given the special facts of
that case, the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content was
"an appropriate incident to defendant's arrest."4°
B. South Dakota v. Neville
In South Dakota v. Neville,41 police officers stopped the defend-
ant's car after observing the defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign.
When the defendant got out of his car, he staggered and fell against
the car for support; the officers also detected alcohol on the defend-
ant's breath. The defendant informed the officers that he did not have
his license because it had been revoked after a previous DWI convic-
tion. The defendant then failed two field sobriety tests.
The defendant was arrested for DWI and then was asked to sub-
mit to a breath test, both at the scene of the arrest and later at the
police station.42 Though warned that he could lose his license if he
refused, he refused the test on three separate occasions. The defendant
sought to suppress all evidence of his refusals, even though South Da-
kota law provides that a refusal may be admitted at trial. The state
circuit court suppressed the evidence and the state supreme court af-
firmed, finding that allowing the evidence of refusal to be admitted
violated the defendant's federal and state privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.43 The state's high court reasoned that, by forcing the defend-
ant to choose between submitting to the examination or having his
refusal admitted against him at trial, the state had compelled an in-
criminating communication. 44 The United States Supreme Court
granted review.45
39. Id. at 771.
40. Id. at 770-71.
41. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
42. Id. at 555-56.
43. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.
1985) (applying South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)).
44. Id. at 726.
45. 459 U.S. at 558.
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court, per Justice O'Connor, began its analysis in
Neville by interpreting Schmerber as allowing "a State to force a per-
son suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol
test."'46 South Dakota, however, had chosen not to force submission
to a test but, rather, to penalize refusal to submit through license revo-
cation and admission of the refusal into evidence at trial. The Court
reasoned that, because "the State could legitimately compel the sus-
pect, against his will, to accede to the test," the state had the option of
offering the arrestee a choice between taking the test or having a re-
fusal admitted in evidence against him to the trier of fact.47 Thus, "a
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully
requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not pro-
tected by the privilege against self-incrimination. '4
C. The Burnett Court's Application of Schmerber and Neville
In the Burnett case, petitioners sought to distinguish the involun-
tary blood test upheld in Schmerber by arguing that the breath test at
issue requires the cooperation of the defendant 49 and, therefore, re-
quires a warrant before it can lawfully be administered.50 The district
court distilled petitioners' argument on this point down to the follow-
ing: (1) because the breath test requires cooperation from a suspect (to
provide the breath needed to activate the breathalyzer), such a search
cannot be considered as a mere incident to arrest but must instead be
considered a consent search; (2) such consent is lacking when a sus-
pect refuses the test; (3) because the Alaska legislature has prohibited
the administration of a chemical test if the suspect refuses, a breath
test is not a search incident to arrest.51 The district court conceded
that petitioners' argument was "novel, subtle, and superficially force-
ful," but concluded that it was without supporting authority.52
In rejecting petitioners' argument, the district court relied on sev-
eral factors. First, a breath test is even less intrusive than the blood
46. Id. at 559.
47. Id. at 563.
48. Id. at 564. For a more thorough discussion of Neville, see Crump, The Admis-
sion of Chemical Test Refusals After State v. Neville: Drunk Drivers Cannot Take the
Fifth, 59 N.D.L. Rav. 349 (1983).
49. The parties stipulated that the cooperation of a suspect is necessary for an
accurate breath test result. 634 F. Supp. at 1036 n.5.
50. Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 9.
51. 634 F. Supp. at 1036. In an apt description, the Municipality noted that, in
essence, defendants' argument seeks to imply from the accepted legal principle that
consent may make legitimate an otherwise illegal search the proposition that lack of
consent will make illegitimate an otherwise permissible search. Brief for Appellee at
7, Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Appellee's Brief].
52. 634 F. Supp. at 1036.
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samples at issue in Schmerber and, therefore, deserving of even less
protection. 53 Second, because under Neville a driver lawfully arrested
for DWI has no constitutional right to refuse to submit to a breath
test,54 a chemical test could constitutionally-if not physically-be ad-
ministered against the suspect's will. Thus, the fact that a driver re-
fuses to submit to the test does not create a constitutional distinction
sufficient to remove the search from the lawful scope of a search inci-
dent to arrest.55
The district court concluded its opinion as follows:
Nothing in the Alaska statutes here at issue deprives [petitioners of
their right to be free of unreasonable searches], or otherwise bur-
dens it. A motorist who has been stopped for driving while intoxi-
cated and who wishes to vindicate himself has two choices under
the law. He may take the test as the state prefers him to do. If he
does, and the evidence is favorable to him, he will gain his prompt
release with no charge being made for drunk driving.[56] If the evi-
dence is unfavorable, he may challenge the government's use of that
evidence by attacking the validity of the arrest. If he does not take
the test, he can still challenge the evidence of his refusal by once
again attacking the validity of the arrest. Either way, he remains
fully capable of asserting the only fourth amendment right he pos-
sesses: the right to avoid arrest on less than probable cause.57
53. Id. at 1037.
54. Id. The district court apparently found persuasive on this point the following
language in a concurring opinion by Judge Singleton of the Alaska Court of Appeals
(which hears appeals only in criminal cases):
[Defendant's] argument confuses a legal concept, "consent," with a factual
concept, "cooperation" or "assent." The two are substantially different.
Consent in the constitutional sense is only required where the defendant has
a legal right to refuse. As we have seen, a legally arrested defendant has no
constitutional right to refuse a breathalyzer examination. True, he may fail
to cooperate or give his assent to a breath test as a matter of fact, but failure
to cooperate does not create a legal right where it would otherwise not exist
.... [A] drunk driver's failure to cooperate in furnishing a breath sample
does not give him a legal right to withhold breathalyzer evidence.
McCracken v. State, 685 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (Singleton, J., con-
curring), quoted in 634 F. Supp. at 1038 n.7. Apparently, Judge Anderson also found
this reasoning persuasive, as he adopted the rationale almost verbatim as part of his
opinion when the Burnett case was before the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See 806 F.2d
at 1450.
55. 634 F. Supp. at 1037.
56. This is not necessarily so. The Anchorage, Alaska, Municipal Prosecutor's
Office has occasionally prosecuted DWI suspects who had registered 0.0% breath al-
cohol, believing it had sufficient evidence to prove intoxication from a substance other
than alcohol. To the extent that this faulty hypothesis provided a basis for the district
court's holding, its holding and that of the Ninth Circuit, which contains identical
language, see 806 F.2d at 1451, is proportionally tainted.
57. 634 F. Supp. at 1040-41 (citation omitted). This whole quote is replicated in
the Ninth Circuit's opinion. See 806 F.2d at 1451. Certainly, neither court means to
imply in the last sentence that the defendants lacked a constitutional right to be free of
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
Alaska's breath test requirement was a reasonable search incident to
arrest, resting its decision primarily on Schmerber. 5 8 Judge Anderson
interpreted Schmerber as setting up a three-part test of whether a
chemical test is constitutionally valid: (1) there must be a "clear indi-
cation" that the evidence will in fact be found; (2) the test chosen to
measure defendant's blood-alcohol level must be a reasonable one;
(3) the test must be performed in a reasonable manner.5 9 Judge An-
derson noted as well that the Schmerber Court also accepted the fact
that obtaining evidence of blood-alcohol level presents an emergency
situation not allowing time to obtain a warrant. 6° Finding that all
three tests were met in the present situation, and apparently assuming,
though not expressly finding, that an emergency existed which pre-
vented the officers from getting a search warrant, Judge Anderson
ruled that "the breathalyzer examination in question is an appropriate
and reasonable search incident to arrest which appellants have no con-
stitutional right to refuse. '61
D. Issues Not Addressed in Burnett
The Schmerber Court, in summarizing that case, concluded that a
blood test of a suspect under arrest for drunk driving was "an appro-
priate incident to [his] arrest. ' 62 Given this language, it is perhaps
understandable that both the district court63 and the Ninth Circuit 64
also characterized the breath test at issue in Burnett as a "search inci-
dent to arrest." However, exceptions permitting warrantless searches
under the fourth amendment have evolved further since Schmerber.
Among the distinct exceptions to the usual rule that a warrant is re-
quired are "searches incident to arrest" and searches justified by "exi-
gent circumstances." While Schmerber intermixed both rationales, at
least linguistically, it may be that Schmerber is more properly charac-
terized as an "exigent circumstances," rather than a "search incident,"
case. In order to evaluate this possibility, the fourth amendment case
law subsequent to Schmerber must be analyzed.
unreasonable searches; rather, they intend merely that the breath test at issue was
reasonable.
58. 806 F.2d at 1449-50. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
59. 806 F.2d at 1449.
60. Id. at 1449-50.
61. Id. at 1450.
62. 384 U.S. at 771; see supra Part IIIA pp. 268-69.
63. 634 F. Supp. at 1037.
64. 806 F.2d at 1450.
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1. Search Incident to Arrest. Prior to 1969, it was generally as-
sumed that the police could search without a warrant the entire prem-
ises where a person was arrested. 65 In Chimel v. California,66
however, the United States Supreme Court restricted the area that
could be searched without a warrant. In Chimel, police went to the
home of a person suspected of robbing a coin shop. The police had an
arrest warrant, but no search warrant. The police arrested the suspect
and then conducted a full search of the three-bedroom home, finding
some of the stolen coins. In analyzing the case, the Court acknowl-
edged the police's right to search the area within the arrestee's imme-
diate control but concluded that an area outside of the arrestee's
control could not be searched without a warrant. The Court reasoned
that an arresting officer may properly search the person for any weap-
ons he or she may use to resist arrest and injure the officer. In addi-
tion, the officer may search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
person or within his or her reach "in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction. ' 67 The Court found ample justification "for a search
of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."' 68 Because the
search in Chimel did not meet this test, the Court invalidated the
search.
In United States v. Chadwick,69 the Supreme Court further clari-
fied its position that a warrantless search may not be validated as one
incident to arrest if conducted "remote in time or place from the
arrest."' 70 Thus, a search of a footlocker which contained marijuana
was not considered a search incident to arrest when it had not been
opened until more than an hour after the arrest and after the suspected
smugglers were safely incarcerated.
If the logic of Chimel were given broad application, all warrant-
less searches incident to arrest would have to be supported by facts
indicating the presence of either weapons or destructible evidence. At
least as to searches of the person, however, the Court has refused to
65. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), rev'd, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (The court held that a search is reasonable if the search is incident to a valid
arrest, if the place searched was a business room open to the public, and if the room
was small and under the complete and immediate control of the arrestee.).
66. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
67. Id. at 763.
68. Id.
69. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
70. Id. at 15 (quoting Preston v. United States., 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)); see also
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970) (Because "a search may be incident to an
arrest 'only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the
immediate vicinity of the arrest,'" the search of arrestee's home after being arrested
outside his home could not be sustained as a search incident to arrest.).
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give Chimel such a broad reading. In United States v. Robinson,71 the
defendant was arrested for driving with a revoked license. After plac-
ing him under arrest, the officer had Robinson get out of the car and
conducted a general frisk. The officer felt a soft, crumpled cigarette
package in Robinson's pocket and discovered capsules of heroin in the
package. The cigarette package was unlikely to contain either weap-
ons or evidence of Robinson's driving without a license. The Court,
nonetheless, upheld the search as one incident to arrest, reasoning that
the "authority to search [a] person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,
does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability
in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact
be found upon the person of the suspect."72 Because it is the fact of a
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, the Court con-
cluded that no additional justification for a "full search" of the person
is required under the fourth amendment. 73
More recently, the Supreme Court has also limited the applica-
tion of the Chimel rule of "immediate control" when applied to
searches of automobiles after a lawful stop. In New York v. Belton,74 a
car in which the defendant and several others were riding was stopped
for speeding. After the officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope
he suspected contained marijuana, he ordered all of the occupants out
of the car and arrested them for unlawful possession. After moving
them some distance from the car, he searched the zippered pocket of
Belton's jacket which was on the back seat of the car and found
cocaine.
In upholding the search, the Supreme Court acknowledged that,
in a given case, the entirety of a car's passenger compartment may not
be within an arrestee's immediate control. However, reasoning that
"articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary ite[m],'"75 the Court opted for a bright line
approach in holding that "when a policeman has made a lawful custo-
dial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contempora-
neous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile... [and] any containers found within the passenger
compartment. ' 76 By the time the jacket was actually searched, Belton
71. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
72. Id. at 235.
73. Id.
74. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
75. Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763).
76. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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had been arrested and secured some distance from the car. The jacket
was, therefore, no longer in his immediate control. The Court, how-
ever, attached no significance to this fact and instead concluded that
because "[t]he jacket was located inside the passenger compartment of
the car in which [Belton] had been a passenger just before he was ar-
rested ... [it] was within the area which we have concluded was
'within the arrestee's immediate control' within the meaning of
Chimel."77
In summary, the post-Chimel cases establish that the "immediate
control" test affords the most protection to the surroundings of sus-
pects in their own home. Searches other than those of the person must
not be remote in time or place from the arrest. Full searches of the
person are presumed to be the valid incident of a lawful arrest, how-
ever, and searches of the passenger compartment of a car and any con-
tainers therein are per se permissible, regardless of whether the
arrestee remains in actual control of the searched area at the time of
the search.
2. Exigent Circumstances Search. In Vale v. Louisiana,78 the
Court suggested that a warrantless search might be permitted if the
goods ultimately seized had been "in the process of destruction," even
if the search was not incident to arrest. In Vale, police arrested appel-
lant outside his residence after observing what they believed to be a
narcotics deal. Although the police had two warrants for Vale's
arrest, they did not have a search warrant for appellant's residence. A
search of the unoccupied home disclosed narcotics, which were seized.
While holding that the search violated appellant's fourth amendment
rights, the Court listed several circumstances which would have justi-
fied the search, including the possibility that the goods were in the
process of being destroyed. The Court concluded, however, that the
mere possibility that accomplices might destroy evidence in the near
future did not meet the "process of destruction" test, and the search of
a house there at issue was invalidated.
The "process of destruction" test was met, however, in Cupp v.
Murphy. 79 There, Murphy had voluntarily appeared at the police sta-
tion for questioning in regard to the strangulation murder of his wife.
During questioning, the police noticed what appeared to be blood on
Murphy's finger. When the police asked if they could take a sample of
scrapings from his fingernails, he refused. After refusing, Murphy put
his hands behind his back and then in his pockets and seemed to be
rubbing his nails against his coins or keys. At that point, the police
77. Id. at 462.
78. 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
79. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
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took the fingernail scrapings against Murphy's will but without plac-
ing him under arrest. The scrapings contained traces of skin and
fabric from the victim's nightgown.
In resolving the case, the Court noted that the search could not be
upheld as a "search incident to arrest" because no arrest had occurred,
even though the Court believed the police had had probable cause to
arrest before they took the scrapings. Nonetheless, the Court con-
cluded that, even though a full-scale search such as one permitted inci-
dent to arrest was unavailable, the "very limited search" involved in
taking fingernail scrapings was justified by the need "to preserve the
highly evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails."80
Other cases following Vale have found exigent circumstances up-
holding warrantless searches in settings other than the imminent de-
struction of evidence. In United States v. Doyle,8 I the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the search of a suspected
narcotics dealer's garage when the search was based on reliable infor-
mation that the evidence would have been moved before a warrant
could have been obtained. And in People v. Sirhan,82 the California
Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of Sirhan Sirhan's house
after the shooting of Robert Kennedy based on "mere possibility" that
the house may have contained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate
prominent political leaders.
In summary, for a warrantless search to be sustained based on
exigent circumstances, there must be probable cause to believe that the
place searched will contain the desired evidence, and there must be
exigent circumstances which excuse obtaining a warrant, such as the
imminent destruction or loss of evidence. 83 In contrast, a "search inci-
dent to arrest" requires probable cause for the arrest, but not probable
cause to believe that the person or place searched will yield evidence.
Police have an automatic right to search on the mere possibility weap-
ons or evidence will be found. In addition, a "search incident to
arrest" does not require exigent circumstances, although in a given
instance, such circumstances may be present.
3. Burnett Analyzed. In order to analyze the Burnett court's
characterization of breath tests as searches incident to arrest, it is help-
ful to outline the manner in which drunk-driving suspects are
80. Id. at 296.
81. 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1972).
82. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
947 (1973), rev'd, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
83. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(e) (1985).
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processed in Anchorage.84 In Anchorage, the initial traffic stop is
based either on driving behavior indicating intoxication or, more typi-
cally, a violation of some other traffic regulation such as speeding or
expired tags.8 5 The officer will conduct field sobriety tests such as re-
quiring the suspect to walk a straight line and touch his or her nose. If
the suspect fails these tests, he or she is placed under arrest and trans-
ported to the police station.8 6
After an arrestee is taken to the downtown testing area, he or she
is asked to provide a breath sample for the Intoximeter 3000.87 It is
the refusal of this test which is a misdemeanor crime under Alaska's
statute. 8 The arrestee must be watched constantly for a twenty-min-
ute period before being allowed to take the test to assure that the arres-
tee does not smoke any tobacco products, as smoking Within the
twenty-minute period preceding the test invalidates the test results.8 9
If an" arrestee is inadvertently allowed to smoke during the twenty-
minute period, the waiting period must begin anew.90
One possible objection to the Burnett court's characterization of
the breath tests conducted downtown as "searches incident to arrest"
84. This information is based on the author's experience as a prosecution intern
where he read hundreds of police reports of drunk-driving arrests and on information
supplied during prosecution intern training.
85. Id.
86. While the author was in Anchorage, the Anchorage Police sometimes used
the results of a portable breathalyzer to establish probable cause for arrest. The porta-
ble breathalyzer is less hccurate than the Intoximeter 3000 used at the police station.
If the suspect's performance on the field sobriety tests did not establish probable cause
for arrest and the officer still believed that the suspect was intoxicated, the officer
could request that the suspect blow into a portable breathalyzer. Refusal to provide a
breath sample for the portable breathalyzer constitutes a traffic infraction punishable
by a fine of up to $300. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(b) & (e) (1987). If the breath
alcohol that was detected by the portable breathalyzer was above a certain level, prob-
able cause was established, and the suspect could then be arrested and transported to
the police station. This manner of utilizing portable breathalyzers was invalidated in
Leslie v. State, 711 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). In Leslie, the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that requiring a suspect to submit to the portable breathalyzer test could
be permitted only if the officer already has probable cause to arrest the suspect for
driving while intoxicated. Id. at 577. Because the results from the portable
breathalyzer tests can no longer be used to supply probable cause for arrest, the
Anchorage Police no longer use the portable breathalyzers. Telephone interview with
Assistant Municipal Prosecutor John McConnaughy, III (Sept. 21, 1988).
87. According to information supplied during prosecution intern training, the In-
toximeter 3000 is a state-of-the-art testing machine superior to the older
"Breathalyzer" series, It is considerably more accurate than the portable
breathalyzers used in the field. See ALAKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 30.005, .010
(Oct. 1985).
88. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (1987).
89. ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 7, § 30.020(1) (Oct. 1985).
90. Id.
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is that the search is remote in time and place from the place of arrest,
seemingly in violation of the holdings of Chadwick and Vale. 91 How-
ever, neither of those cases involved searches of one's person. Because
the site of the defendant and the site of the search are one and the
same when applied to breath tests, the fact that the test is not per-
formed at the scene of the arrest should not matter. This outcome is
buttressed by the holding in United States v. Edwards92 that personal
effects found on an arrestee at the scene of the arrest may later be
searched without warrant at the place of detention, regardless of
elapsed time.
One argument that the downtown breath tests are valid "searches
incident to arrest" is that they are simply part of a "full search" of the
person justified by a lawful arrest within the meaning of Robinson.
This argument, however, contradicts the express holding of Schmerber
that, because of "human dignity and privacy" interests, searches be-
yond the body's surface cannot be upheld merely as incident to lawful
arrest.93 The Schmerber Court's heightened solicitousness towards
"human dignity" where inner body searches are involved is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Rochin v. California 94 that a con-
viction for selling narcotics obtained by using evidence retrieved
through forced stomach pumping violated due process. It is this ex-
press removal by the Schmerber Court of chemical tests from the
gamut of searches normally covered as incident to arrest that most
clearly takes chemical tests from the "search incident" category.
In language very reminiscent of the "exigent circumstances" ra-
tionale, the Schmerber Court instead relied on the probable cause pres-
ent in that case to sustain the arrest as providing the probable cause
necessary to show that evidence of intoxication would be found
through the blood test.95 Finding that the pending loss of evidence
91. See supra notes 69-70, 78 and accompanying text.
92. 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (The court admitted Edward's clothing into evidence
even though not taken from him until the morning following his late-night arrest,
stating "once the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his pos-
session at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his
arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substan-
tial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative
processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the
other.").
93. 384 U.S. at 769-70; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
94. 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("It would be a stultification of the responsibility
which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in
order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can
extract what is in his stomach.").
95. 384 U.S. at 770.
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presented an emergency and that the test method was reasonable and
non-offensive, the Schmerber Court upheld the blood test.96
In Burnett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit also concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe that
petitioners were under the influence of alcohol and, thus, had probable
cause to believe that a breath test would indicate that petitioners had
consumed significant quantities of alcohol.97 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit made no express finding that an emergency was present in the
Burnett case,98 but merely concluded that the breath tests met the
"reasonableness" requirements of Schmerber and were, therefore,
properly characterized as "searches incident to arrest." 99 A close
reading of Schmerber shows this characterization by both the Ninth
Circuit and the district courtl°° to be mistaken. 01 Instead, the breath
tests at issue in Burnett are properly understood to have been searches
which could only be justified by "exigent circumstances."
As a practical matter, probable cause sufficient to sustain an
arrest for drunk driving will in most cases also provide sufficient prob-
able cause to believe a breath test will show evidence of intoxication,
as is required by the first prong of the "exigent circumstances" ration-
ale. However, to be valid under this rationale, there must be an "exi-
gent circumstance" as well. In the breath test context, this "exigent
96. Id. at 770-71.
97. 806 F.2d at 1450.
98. In the portion of the opinion immediately preceding the application of
Schmerber to the facts of Burnett, Judge Anderson quotes the portion of Schmerber
describing the rapid loss of alcohol from the blood stream. 806 F.2d at 1449-50.
Judge Anderson may have intended the reader to infer from this quote that a similar
emergency existed in the facts of Burnett
99. Id. at 1450.
100. 634 F. Supp. at 1037.
101. The Ninth Circuit's confusion on this matter is explained by its failure to
accurately interpret Schmerber. Judge Anderson began by interpreting Schmerber as
allowing a compelled blood test "where there [is] probable cause to arrest [a suspect]
for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor." 806 F.2d at 1449. Judge An-
derson further interpreted Schmerber as setting up a three-part test: "First, there
must be a 'clear indication' that in fact the desired evidence will be found. Second, the
test chosen to measure defendant's blood alcohol level must be a reasonable one.
Third, the test chosen must be performed in a reasonable manner." Id. Significantly,
Judge Anderson neglected to include the requirement for an exigent circumstance, or,
in the words of Schmerber, an "emergency." The first prong of Judge Anderson's
interpretation should have alerted him that he was not dealing with a "search incident
to arrest" as currently understood, seeing it is the fact of arrest, not any "clear indica-
tion" that evidence will be found, which justifies such searches. However, this nuance
eluded him, and he missed an opportunity to clarify for future litigants that Schmerber
is properly understood as an "exigent circumstances" case.
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circumstance" will most likely be supplied by a threatened loss of evi-
dence of intoxication over time. This requirement for an "exigent cir-
cumstance" constitutes a weak link in the Ninth Circuit's holding,
even if the court impliedly found that an emergency existed.102
In Anchorage, there is a magistrate on duty twenty-four hours
per day, 365 days per year. Given the United States Supreme Court's
approval of telephonic search warrants,10 3 it is likely that Anchorage
police officers could obtain a warrant during the twenty-minute period
described above without delaying the procurement of the test results.
Depending on the telephonic availability of magistrates elsewhere in
Alaska, this may be true state-wide. Obtaining a warrant would divert
officers and magistrates from other tasks, and both would likely resent
the requirement. However, inconvenience does not excuse non-com-
pliance with fourth amendment requirements. Thus, in Anchorage,
and perhaps all of Alaska, it may be difficult to justify not getting a
warrant based on "impossibility" or an emergency prospect of loss of
evidence.
The court in Burnett was not made aware of the twenty-minute
waiting period, perhaps because defense counsel was unaware of actual
practice. This factual reality, however, does provide the clearest basis
for distinguishing Burnett's, Roop's, and Ryan's circumstances from
those at issue in Schmerber. Fear of loss of evidence was the primary
factor animating the Supreme Court's decision in that case. The other
factors relied upon in Schmerber-likeihood of success and reasona-
bleness of method-merely provided the rationale for permitting a
warrantless search in such "emergency" circumstances.
In summary, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit inaccu-
rately believed they were dealing with a "search incident to arrest"
when they were considering breath tests. Because they labored under
this premise, both courts neglected to make the proper inquiry: Was
there an "exigent circumstance" which excused obtaining a search
warrant? To the extent that further fact finding would have shown
such a circumstance did not exist, the Burnett case must be considered
to have been wrongly decided under current case law.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. See, eg., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 557-58
(1985) ("[Tlhe Government's interest in proceeding expeditiously could have been
achieved by obtaining a telephonic search warrant .... "); Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) ("[If a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant
can usually be obtained.").
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E. Implications of Breath Tests as "Exigent Circumstances"
Searches
When breath tests become properly understood as searches justi-
fied by exigent circumstances, state power to enforce drunk driving
laws may actually be enhanced. Perhaps even the faint scent of alco-
hol on the breath of a driver would provide an officer with probable
cause to believe that a breath test would provide "highly evanescent
evidence" of a crime, even though such a scent is probably insufficient
probable cause for a sustainable arrest. And because absence of prob-
able cause to arrest would prevent lengthy detention to obtain a search
warrant, perhaps an exigent circumstance excusing the search warrant
requirement exists, thereby permitting a warrantless search in the field
to obtain the "evanescent evidence."
Interpreting Schmerber as allowing chemical tests only after
arrest may unnecessarily restrict the enforcement options available to
the states. If facts such as those hypothesized above can meet both
prongs of the test, law enforcement options could be enhanced.
F. Possibilities for the Future
Under current Supreme Court precedent, a warrantless breath
test should be deemed a search requiring some exigent circumstance to
be valid. However, were this issue to come before the Supreme Court,
the Court could take the opportunity simply to create an irrebuttable
presumption that where there is probable cause to believe a chemical
test will produce evidence of drunk driving, there is also an exigent
"emergency" threat of lost evidence sustaining the test. Because it is
"generally, even if not inevitably," 104 true that a threatened loss of
evidence may exist, the Court would be merely extending to a new
factual setting its approach in Belton, where it decided simply to pre-
sume that the entire passenger compartment of a car was within an
occupant's "immediate control" within the meaning of Chimel 10 5
Given the widespread concern within society about drunk-driving,
such a result would not be surprising.
104. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (discussed supra at notes 73-
76). In creating the per se rule that the passenger compartment of a car may be
searched as an incident to an arrest, the Belton court reasoned that "articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of the automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within the 'area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
105. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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IV. BREATH TESTS AS CONSENT SEARCHES
Petitioners' primary argument throughout the various levels of
judicial review was that because the breath test requirement could not
be justified as a search incident to arrest, it could only be justified
based on consent, and that, here, no consent had been given. 10 6 The
theory of consent searches is that an otherwise impermissible search is
legitimated if the suspect gives legally sufficient consent.10 7 The peti-
tioners' argument that consent was lacking and the district court's
.holding that consent was supplied by the "implied consent" statute
must be evaluated in light of the Supreme Court's precedents develop-
ing the consent search rationale.
A. Consent Searches and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's leading case in this area is Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 10 8 Bustamonte was a passenger in a car which was
stopped for a traffic violation. Another passenger consented to a
search of the car and stolen checks were found which were used as
evidence to convict Bustamonte of unlawful possession of checks.
The Court upheld the validity of the consent. In so doing, the
Court reasoned that two competing concerns, the police's need for
consent searches and the need to assure absence of coercion, are fairly
accommodated by determining the "voluntariness" of the consent.109
Noting that it is the state's burden to establish that a given consent
was "freely and voluntarily given," 110 the Court set forth the vague
test that voluntariness of consent is determined by "examining all the
surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent was co-
erced.""' The guiding principle is to be whether the consent is "the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker"
106. As has been suggested, the better argument may have been that no exigent
circumstance was present to justify a non-consensual warrantless search. See supra
Part III pp. 267-81.
107. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 82, at § 3.10(a); see also Christianson v.
State, 734 P.2d 1027 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (evidence of stolen parts seized from
truck during search properly admitted against defendant where truck driver gave valid
consent to search).
108. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
109. Id. at 227.
110. Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968),
which invalidated consent given by a defendant's grandmother to police officers who
claimed to have a search warrant). In announcing the "free and voluntary" test for
consent searches, the Schneckloth Court acknowledged that it was setting up a test less
demanding than the "knowing and intelligent waiver" test required for the valid
waiver of trial rights. Id. at 235-38.
111. Id. at 229.
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or whether "his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-deter-
mination critically impaired." 112 Expressly rejecting a rule that prose-
cutors must prove that a suspect "affirmatively knew of his right to
refuse" consent,1 13 the Schneckloth Court found legally valid consent
had been given. 114
In United States v. Mendenhall, 115 the Court clarified that it is the
subjective mental state of the suspect which determines whether con-
sent to a search is "in fact voluntary." 116 There, Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") agents approached the respondent and
asked to see her identification and airline ticket. Finding a discrep-
ancy between the names found therein, the agents requested that the
respondent accompany them to the DEA airport office. Once there,
the agents asked the respondent for permission to search her handbag
and person. The respondent replied, "Go ahead." Thereafter, a fe-
male police officer arrived, and again respondent gave her consent to
these searches. The officer then informed the respondent that she
would have to remove her clothes for the search. Although the re-
spondent replied that she had a plane to catch, she was assured by the
officer that if no drugs were found there would be no problems. The
respondent then removed her clothing without further comment, and
heroin was found during the search.' 17 The respondent argued on ap-
peal that the consent was not voluntary but, rather, coerced. Noting
that the officers had told her she could refuse consent, the Court con-
cluded she had in fact consented and that her consent was in fact
voluntary.
Examples of the Court's finding valid consent lacking include
consent based on a false claim by the police that they already had a
search warrant, 81 8 and truthful statements by the police that they have
a search warrant which in fact turns out to be invalid.
119
112. Id. at 225-26.
113. Id. at 229-30.
114. The Schneckloth Court, there dealing with an out-of-custody search, left open
the possibility that a more rigorous test might apply in an in-custody setting. Id. at
240 n.29. This possibility was foreclosed in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1985). There, after the defendant was arrested, police asked whether they could
search his car without advising him that he could refuse permission. The defendant
granted his permission. The Court concluded that the mere fact that an in-custody
consenting party is not told of his or her right to refuse consent does not invalidate a
search where the consent given nonetheless seems voluntary.
115. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
116. Id. at 557.
117. Id. at 549.
118. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
119. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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The Court's cases interpreting consent searches have all involved
some communication at the time of the search, either verbal120 or non-
verbal, 121 purportedly consenting to a search. The issue has been
whether the communication was in fact voluntary,122 or in some way
coerced. 123
B. Consent Holding in Burnett
In the district court opinion in Burnett, Judge Holland suggests
that Alaska's breath test requirement is also sustainable as a valid con-
sent search. Specifically, the judge states the following:
The Alaska legislature and the Anchorage assembly have... deter-
mined [through their implied consent laws] that once a driver un-
dertakes to operate a car within the state or city, he has consented
to the taking of a breath sample. Having given his consent by oper-
ating a car on the state or city highways, a driver may not legally
recant or withdraw such consent after being lawfully arrested for
driving while intoxicated. Of course, the driver may choose not to
cooperate in the providing of the breath sample ... but just as that
lack of cooperation was no bar to a finding that a driver has no
constitutional right to refuse the test, it ought not be seen as a lack
of consent in the legal sense, for that consent has already been
given. 124
The opinion, then, does a curious, immediate about-face. Having just
concluded that valid, non-withdrawable consent has been given by
drivers on Alaska's roads, Judge Holland asserts in the next two
paragraphs that petitioners' reliance on Schneckloth is misplaced, be-
cause a "driver stopped on probable cause for driving while intoxi-
cated has no consent to withhold ... for ... purposes of ... fourth
amendment analysis."12 5 Thus, in the same rhetorical breath, Judge
Holland asserts that the breath test requirement is valid both because
consent has been given and because no consent can be given.
120. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1985); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); supra
notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
121. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549, 559 (1980); supra notes
115-17 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
123. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) ("Where there is coer-
cion there cannot be consent."); see generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 83,
at § 3.10.
124. 634 F. Supp. at 1038. Why consent cannot later be withdrawn is not ex-
plained and is contrary to the original theory of implied consent. See infra note 134.
It seems that in some manner the judge is applying a specific performance or other
contract theory in the realm of criminal law.
125. 634 F. Supp. at 1038.
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Exactly what proposition is being argued for here is not clear.
Perhaps Judge Holland is arguing that the state can, through its im-
plied consent law, create a statutory substitute which somehow meets
the "voluntariness" requirements of Schneckloth. This would be a
radical expansion of the manner in which the state can meet its burden
of proving free and voluntary consent. However, if this is the proposi-
tion, Judge Holland should have said Schneckloth applies but the con-
stitutional test has been met, not that Schneckloth does not apply
because a DWI suspect has no consent to withhold. Judge Holland
provides no explanation of how implied consent supplied by an im-
plied consent statute can meet the Schneckloth "voluntariness" test.
The Ninth Circuit did not affirm, reverse, or discuss Judge Hol-
land's proposition that the breath test requirement was sustainable as
a consent search. Instead, the court sustained the requirement solely
on the "search incident to arrest" rationale. 126 However, because
blood and breath tests cannot be sustained as searches incident to
arrest and probably cannot be sustained as exigent circumstance
searches, 127 Judge Holland's implied consent rationale is important to
the sustainability of these tests as warrantless searches.
Judge Holland's implied consent rationale is also of interest be-
cause it could be used in settings other than blood and breath tests of
suspected drunk drivers. For example, the Alaska Legislature might
disregard the fact that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on
a basis other than Judge Holland's "implied consent" rationale and
erroneously conclude that the Ninth Circuit has approved its use of
implied consent in the custodial arrest setting. Feeling thus validated,
the Alaska Legislature may seek to extend its use of implied consent to
other areas. The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that a
state could require all individuals to carry state approved identification
when traveling outside one's home128 and that a state could require all
126. See supra Part III pp. 267-81.
127. Id.
128. In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), the Court struck down as un-
constitutionally vague a California statute which had been interpreted in state courts
as requiring an individual to present "credible and reliable" identification to a police
officer who requests it. While acknowledging that the requirement implicates the con-
stitutional right of free movement, the Court simply concluded that the notion of
"credible and reliable" identification was too vague to allow individuals to know what
they must do to meet the standard. Id. at 358-61. Of course, one way a state could
clarify the matter would be to require all individuals to carry identification of a pre-
scribed form, which in turn would be defined as meeting the requirement of presenting
peace officers with "credible and reliable" information. Were a state to do this, the
Court would then be forced to confront some of the issues it ducked in Kolender. See
id. at n.10.
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
motorists to stop at fixed checkpoints for sobriety checks. 129 Alaska
could attempt to implement such identification and checkpoint
schemes and, as added inducements to compliance, include in its statu-
tory scheme a presumption that anyone in public places in Alaska has
impliedly consented to a test of his breath alcohol 130 and that anyone
driving in Alaska has impliedly consented to a search of his breath at
fixed checkpoints. Refusal could involve loss of identification or
driver's license or perhaps, as in Burnett, criminal sanctions. While it
is beyond the scope of this article to explore the other constitutional
issues that such a scheme might involve, such as the right to privacy
and the right to travel, it is worthwhile to explore further whether
Judge Holland's use of statutorily implied consent can be valid even
within the factual context of Burnett.
C. Challenges to Burnett's Consent Holding
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court cases interpret-
ing consent searches have all involved some communication purport-
edly consenting to a search. The issue has been whether the
communication was in fact voluntary or in some way coerced.1 31 It is
perhaps instructive that when the Supreme Court has had the oppor-
tunity to determine whether chemical tests could be justified as con-
sent searches, it ducked the issue, preferring instead to uphold them
on other grounds.1 32 This is probably because chemical tests as cur-
rently conducted in most states do not easily fit within the analytical
framework of consent searches as currently understood. Each of these
problems will now be explored.
129. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court upheld
brief stops at fixed checkpoints to check for the possible transportation of illegal
aliens. The Court simply weighed the public interest in illegal alien interdiction
against the individual's fourth amendment interests and concluded that the public
interest there involved was greater. Id. at 557. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), the Court held that random traflic stops to check registration and driver's
license status were impermissible seizures under the fourth amendment, but it noted in
dicta that "[q]uestioning of all on-coming trafic at roadblock-type stops [was] one
possible alternative." Id at 663.
While illegal aliens arguably may burden the nation's economic health, and un-
registered vehicles and unlicensed drivers may pose some degree of safety problems, it
is unlikely that they cause as great a burden on society as the deaths caused by drunk
drivers. It would thus seem that society's interest in sobriety checkpoints is even
greater than the interests at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse.
130. Such a requirement could assist in the prosecution of such crimes as "posses-
sion of a firearm while intoxicated" and "public drunkenness."
131. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Parts IIIA and IIIB pp. 268-70.
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1. If No Consent to Withhold, Then Not a Consent Search. The
underlying premise of consent searches is that the person searched has
consent to withhold. If the search can be sustained on other grounds,
such as search incident to arrest or exigent circumstances, no consent
is necessary. Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that breath tests
cannot be sustained on some other rationale, but only as a consent
search, the crucial inquiry becomes when and if voluntary consent is
given. In the breath test context, there are only three possible times
that consent could be given: (1) at the time one's driver's license is
issued; (2) each time one chooses by one's actions to drive on public
roads; or (3) at the time an officer requests submission to the test.
All of the Supreme Court cases on point have involved some re-
quest by a person of authority to allow the search at or near the time
of the search followed by the granting of permission. If one implies
from these cases that there must be an individualized request to search
in each case followed by an opportunity to refuse, then licensure or
driving could not provide valid consent, because no request has yet
been made. Thus, the argument goes, an officer must obtain the
driver's consent, not just his or her cooperation, at or near the time the
officer desires to obtain evidence of breath alcohol.
In Alaska, however, the refusal to cooperate in a breath test con-
stitutes a crime. Thus, in Judge Holland's words, an individual asked
to take a breath test has "no consent to withhold" in the legal sense of
the term.133 If at the time of the request there is no consent to with-
hold and if the time of request is the only time consent can be ob-
tained, then this circumstance does not fall within the factual
predicate for a consent search and could not be validated based on
"consent search" rationale.134
133. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
134. Alaska's approach to implied consent departs from the original theory of im-
plied consent. The original theory behind implied-consent statutes presumes a right
on the part of the requestee to refuse the test. Implied-consent statutes were passed in
response to the Supreme Court's holding in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
disallowing evidence of concealed narcotics through forced stomach pumping. See
Bruns, supra note 3, at 938-44. To avoid the constitutional problems presented by
Rochin in searching beyond the body's surface, states began to pass during the 1950's
their implied-consent statutes imposing the civil penalty of license revocation for re-
fusal to submit to a chemical test. As articulated by one commentator, these "statutes
were predicated upon the theoretical proposition that in return for the 'privilege' of
driving upon the highways of the state, the driver had impliedly 'consented' to take a
chemical sobriety test if properly requested to do so by an officer of the state. If a
person refused to take a test, he in effect withdrew the consent upon which his right to
drive was conditioned, and the state was thereby entitled to revoke the conditional
privilege of driving." See Note, Implied Consent, supra, note 3, at 724-25. Stated
another way, the requestee voluntarily chooses to void an agreement between himself
and the state, thereby avoiding the test but losing the right to drive which the agree-
ment had allowed. Thus, under the original implied consent theory, the requestee
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2. Can Implied Consent Searches Be "In Fact Voluntary?" It
would be difficult to argue that an out-of-state motorist crossing into
Alaska for the first time, who, under Alaska law has impliedly con-
sented to the breath-test requirement, in fact has the subjective mental
state of voluntary consent required by the fourth amendment. In the
absence of actual knowledge of Alaska law, ascribing voluntary con-
sent to these drivers can be achieved only through a legal fiction, statu-
tory or otherwise, that the driver impliedly has consented to the search
by driving on the roads of Alaska. This, of course, is Judge Holland's
precise argument. However, legal fictions are just that. They have
nothing to do with what "in fact" is. If the requirement of United
States v. Mendenhall, that consent must be "in fact voluntary," is to be
given full force, then legal fictions are irrelevant. Thus, under current
precedent, out-of-state drivers unaware of Alaska law must provide
consent at the time they are requested to take a breath test. If they
refuse, consent cannot be implied by statute. However, given the
Supreme Court's recent affection for legal fictions,135 it may adopt a
new one in this situation were the matter to reach it.
If one accepts the Supreme Court's precedents as permitting con-
sent for a search to be given remote in time and place from where a
search eventually takes place and one assumes along with Judge Hol-
land that consent cannot be revoked once given,136 then the "in fact
voluntary" test may arguably be met as to in-state driver licensees.
This would be based on a presumption that knowledge of the implied
consent statute obtained at the time of licensure provides actual con-
sent for the breath test once requested. One might further presume,
based on the knowledge of the implied consent statute obtained at the
time of licensure, that each time the licensee drives upon the roads of
Alaska, he or she voluntarily consents anew to a breath test. Such
logic might further hold that a driver is in a continual state of "con-
senting" whenever driving, thereby taking the time of consent right up
to the time of request, and thereby avoiding any remoteness in time or
place problems.
could refuse the test without fear of criminal sanction and subject only to a "civil
sanction" or the loss of valuable agreement, depending on which theoretical construct
is used.
135. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that a search of a
zipped jacket pocket was valid as a search incident to lawful arrest because the jacket
was "within the arrestee's immediate control," despite the fact that the jacket was
located inside the car and that the arrestee was not within the reach of the vehicle); see
also supra notes 74-77, 104 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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However, the Supreme Court has determined that the presence of
"coercion" also undermines any finding of voluntariness. 137 Under
Alaska's statutory scheme, one who refuses a chemical test must be
told that a refusal is a misdemeanor crime. Being threatened with pos-
sible jail and fines for not "consenting" would seem to be the ultimate
in coercion, such that submission to a chemical test after such a re-
quest could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be considered "vol-
untary." Nor would a statute declaring the submission to the test to
be consensual of itself make the submission voluntary "in fact." Sub-
mission to the test would remain the improper product of coercion
and, thus, could not be a valid consent search.
Even at the licensing stage, absence of coercion is doubtful under
the implied consent scheme, both in Alaska and in other jurisdictions.
In Garrity v. New Jersey, 138 the Supreme Court considered a similar
situation in the context of confession. There, the Court reversed a
conviction that was based on incriminating statements made under the
threat that the defendant's silence would result in the loss of his state
employment. The Court reasoned that: "[t]he option to lose [one's]
means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the
antithesis of free choice .... [It] is 'likely to exert such pressure upon
an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice
*.... ", 139 Furthermore, the Court stated that "[w]here the choice is
'between the rock and the whirlpool,'" duress is inherent in deciding
to "waive" one or the other. "It always is for the interest of a party
under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a
choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress."'14
Many people are dependent on their cars for their livelihood.141 Any
137. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text; see also Poulin, Evidentiary
Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 191, 206-09, 218-22 (1984).
138. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
139. Id. at 497-98 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966)).
140. Union Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918).
141. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court noted the
following in the context of random traffic stops:
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of trans-
portation to and from one's home, work place, and leisure activities. Many
people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the
streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in
traveling in an automobile than they do in... other modes of travel. Were
the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he
entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
would be seriously circumscribed.
Id. at 662-63. In Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954),
a New York court noted that
[t]o many persons, the right to own a motor vehicle and the right to possess
a license to drive the same are among the most cherished rights of a citizen
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demand that an individual give up his right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches in return for the privilege to drive can only be considered
coercive, regardless of the theoretical justification underlying the origi-
nal implied consent theory. 142 This would be true of the threat of rev-
ocation used in most states and would be especially true in Alaska's
scheme of threatened criminal sanctions. Thus, whatever consent is
obtained through these threatened sanctions is the product of coer-
cion. Such consent cannot be deemed "voluntary" in the constitu-
tional sense, and cannot be used to sustain warrantless chemical tests
as consent searches.
3. Unconstitutional Conditions. If breath tests are to be justified
as consent searches, then the states must be seen as attempting to re-
quire individuals to consent to an otherwise impermissible search in
order to receive the valuable privilege of driving. This attempt runs up
against the argument that the states are seeking to condition a privi-
lege on the relinquishment of a constitutional right,143 an argument
made unsuccessfully by the petitioners in Burnett. 144 Both the district
court 145 and the Ninth Circuit'" rejected this argument based on the
conclusion that the breath test requirement was supportable as a
search incident to arrest, and, therefore, no burden on a constitutional
right was involved. However, if Judge Holland wanted to justify the
breath-test requirement as a valid consent search, he would have had
to address the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which he did not.
At least one other court has rejected such an "implied consent"
rationale in a similar context. In United States v. Lopez, 147 the govern-
ment argued that airline passengers impliedly consent to boarding
in this free country. The very livelihood of many, such as chauffeurs, truck-
ers, farmers, etc., and the very welfare of their families depend upon their
right to use the highways. In fact, it is clear that one's inalienable right to
"liberty and the pursuit of happiness" is curtailed if he may be unreasonably
kept off the highways maintained at his expense .... [O]ne court has...
gone so far as to say that "the freedom to make use of one's own property,
here a motor vehicle, as a'means of getting about from place to place,
whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a 'liberty' which under the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without due
process of law."
Id. at 127 (quoting Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
915 (1953)).
142. See supra note 134.
143. Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-
94 (1926) ("state... may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights").
144. Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 13-15.
145. 634 F. Supp. at 1039.
146. 806 F.2d at 1450.
147. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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searches. Noting that the government was insisting that individuals
must voluntarily relinquish their fourth amendment rights in order to
enjoy the constitutional right of travel, the court concluded that "im-
plied consent under such circumstances would be inherently coercive"
and therefore invalid.148
D. Final Thoughts on Breath Tests as Consent Searches
Judge Holland's attempt to fit chemical tests within the consent
search framework is built on a shaky foundation of "if's." If there can
be consent without a right of refusal, if consent can be given remote in
time and place prior to the search, if such consent cannot be revoked,
if statutorily implied consent can equal actual consent, if consent ob-
tained through threat of imprisonment or license revocation is free of
coercion and voluntary, and if requiring consent for a bodily search in
return for the right to drive is not a burden on fourth amendment
rights, then a breath test can be a consent search. This is carrying
legal fiction further than is merited. Professor Lerblance aptly sum-
marizes the problem as follows:
To say that implied-consent statutes are not based upon constitu-
tional notions of voluntary consent is not to say that these statutes
are unconstitutional. Rather, it is to suggest that the statutes are
erroneously labeled and expound a faulty concept. If the state can
with impunity label coercion "consent," surely the idea suffers as a
normative guide in other contexts as well. This false labeling is not
only an affront to the concept of consent, but also damages the in-
tegrity of the law as a mechanism for justice. Legal fictions are not
uncommon in the law, but they are generally spawned of necessity.
In the instant case there is neither necessity nor justification. There
is no imperative to clothe this statutory mechanism in the legal fic-
tion of consent. Implied-consent statutes may be desirable, even
necessary, but the label and express premise-implied consent-is
optional. 149
V. CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment requires that searches must be reasonable
in order to be constitutional. In turn, a reasonable search usually re-
quires a warrant. For a search to be warrantless, it must be either a
consensual or a non-consensual search within one of the specific ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. The requirement in all states
that drivers submit to a chemical test when under arrest for suspicion
of intoxicated driving, the refusal of which is penalized either with
criminal sanctions or license revocation, may be sustained in a given
case, but not as searches incident to arrest as the Burnett court, some
148. Id. at 1093.
149. Lerblance, supra note 3, at 64.
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commentators,150 and the implied consent statutes have assumed. In-
stead, there must be an exigent circumstance excusing the procure-
ment of a warrant. Realizing that chemical tests may be given without
a warrant only if there is an exigent circumstance may restrict war-
rantless chemical tests beyond what is current practice. Finally, be-
cause chemical tests cannot be voluntary in fact and free of coercion,
implied consent statutes cannot sustain these tests as consent searches.
Because the implied consent concept is not valid even within the con-
text of chemical tests, society need not fear that the implied consent
approach will be expanded beyond its current coverage of suspects
under arrest based on probable cause.
150. See id. at 46 n.21; Note, Implied Consent, supra note 3, at 760.
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